THIS BLOG is NOW RETIRED

I began this blog in May 2009 following the death of Marcia Powell at Perryville State Prison in Goodyear, Arizona. It is not intended to prescribe the path that leads to freedom from the prison industrial complex.

Rather, these are just my observations in arguably the most racist, fascist, militaristic state in the nation at a critical time in history for a number of intersecting liberation movements. From Indigenous resistance to genocidal practices, to the fight over laws like SB1070 and the ban on Ethnic Studies, Arizona is at the center of many battles for human rights, and thus the struggle for prison abolition as well - for none are free until all are. I retired the blog in APRIL 2013.

Visit me now at Arizona Prison Watch or Survivors of Prison Violence-AZ
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Showing posts with label neglect. Show all posts
Showing posts with label neglect. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 5, 2012

UPDATE: ASPC-Lewis Hep C exposure incident

excellent report by Craig Harris at the AZ Republic is at the bottom.

 --------------------
Bury Hep C, Not People.... 

Wexford Health Sources, Phoenix (JULY 2012)

Wexford connection for prisoner health information:
toll free 1-855-890-6307, or email your request to azcorrections@wexfordhealth.com

This media release comes to us this afternoon from Wendy Halloran at KPNX Channel 12 News. They will be covering the story tonight at 5pm and 6pm. Wendy was recently nominated for an Emmy for her investigation of the highly preventable suicide of Tony Lester.

Hep C is already a leading killer in our state prisons. Nearly 6,000 prisoners are already diagnosed with it, and another 20-30% of the prison population likely have it but don't know it yet...

From: LAMOREAUX, BILL [mailto:BLAMOREA@azcorrections.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, September 04, 2012 11:35 AM
To: Halloran, Wendy
Subject: RE: MEDIA REQUEST FROM WENDY HALLORAN AT 12 NEWS

Ms. Halloran:

On August 27, 2012, a potential exposure event occurred at the Arizona State Prison Complex – Lewis while administering medication. A vial of medication, which may have been compromised with a previously used syringe, was subsequently used to treat additional inmates.

Review of this event determined the potential exposure to Hepatitis C and involved up to 105 inmates. As a result, these inmates were notified and are currently being screened for infectious diseases as per protocol in such an exposure event. An independent laboratory, under contract with Wexford, will provide continued medical monitoring and testing of these potentially exposed inmates over the next several months. All patients will be informed of the results of the testing.

The medical protocols related to this potential exposure have been reviewed to ensure that subsequent events do not occur. The initial event remains under review by Wexford Health, the contracted provider responsible for inmate health care.

The nurse who violated the basic infection control protocols is an employee of a staffing agency under contract with Wexford Health. Wexford has banned the nurse from working under any of its contracts and has also requested that the individual be referred to the State Board of Nursing for investigation.

Regards,

Bill

---------from the AZ Republic------------

Prison nurse tied to hepatitis C exposure



A nurse for the new medical provider for Arizona prisons may have exposed 103 inmates at the Buckeye state prison to hepatitis C by contaminating the prison's insulin supply, and state and local health officials were not alerted for more than a week.

Officials with the state and Maricopa County health departments, who confirmed to The Arizona Republic on Tuesday that they had not been informed by Wexford Health Sources Inc. of the problem, said they will launch investigations into the incident.

Official notification of the Aug. 27 error only came late Tuesday afternoon, hours after an inmate's family member had told 12 News of the potential health risk.

State rules require health-care providers and correctional facilities to notify health departments within five business days of a hepatitis C diagnosis, treatment or detection.

Wexford said it suspended the nurse on Aug. 27, immediately after learning the person "had violated basic infection-control protocols while administering medication that day."

"In talking with the Department of Health Services, they believe it should have been reported first to the county," Corrections Director Charles Ryan said late Tuesday. "That is a question we will have of Wexford -- as to the lack of notification or an explanation as to why that did not occur.

"The department has concerns about this issue, and we will be having further discussions with Wexford in terms of this requirement and some other issues as well."

Ryan said the incident occurred when a diabetic inmate who also has hepatitis C was administered a routine dose of insulin by the nurse on Aug. 27. The needle used on that inmate was inserted into another vial to draw more insulin for the same inmate.

Ryan said the contaminated needle was inserted into a vial which was then put back among other vials in the prison's medication refrigerator. It got mixed up with other vials used throughout that day to administer insulin injections to more than 100 other diabetic inmates. Later that day, Ryan said, officials realized that the vial that potentially had been tainted with hepatitis C may have been used to dose other inmates.

At that point, the nurse in question was suspended and prison officials sought to determine how many inmates may have been exposed.

All the vials of medicine were destroyed after the discovery.

Wexford spokesman Larry Pike on Tuesday minimized the potential exposure of other inmates. He said that the company acted "expeditiously" to identify those who were potentially affected and that the company believes the potential for their exposure was small.

Though corrections officials and Wexford declined to name the nurse, the Arizona State Board of Nursing identified her as Nwadiuto Jane Nwaohia. She has been under state investigation since June 2012 for unsafe practice or substandard care, but the board would not provide additional information on the nature of the previous problem.

Corrections officials first acknowledged the matter Tuesday morning after 12 News asked about the incident at the Arizona State Prison Complex-Lewis, which houses 5,382 inmates in minimum- to maximum-security facilities.

Hepatitis C is the leading cause of liver transplants and causes liver cancer. Seventy-five to 85 percent of people with hepatitis C develop a chronic infection, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Shoana Anderson, head of the state Office of Infectious Disease Services, said one of the biggest dangers for those infected with hepatitis C is "it sits in the liver quietly, and 20 years later, a person can develop severe liver disease."

Anderson and Jeanene Fowler, a spokeswoman for the Maricopa County Department of Public Health, said Wexford should have notified them of the issue.

"It's extremely disturbing that something like this could happen. It calls for a thorough investigation to determine all of the surrounding causes of the mistake or the negligence," said Don Specter of the Prison Law Office, a prison watchdog group based in Berkeley, Calif.

Ken Kopczynski, executive director of the Private Corrections Working Group in Tallahassee, Fla., called the incident "scary" and said it shows a lack of oversight by corrections officials.

"This is a problem with privatization," Kopczynski said. "They are just accepting who Wexford will hire."

Wexford, which has previously lost contracts for poor service in other jurisdictions, this spring won a $349 million, three-year contract to provide health care for Arizona inmates. The company began providing services for nearly 40,000 Arizona inmates on July 1.

In a written statement, the Pittsburgh-based company said it suspended the nurse immediately upon learning she "may have compromised a vial of medication by placing it in contact with a previously used syringe."

Wexford, in its statement, said a local staffing agency assigned the nurse to the prison complex. The company said that at no time was the same syringe and needle used on more than one patient and that no staff members were exposed.

Wexford said it reported the nurse to the state nursing board for investigation, but that did not occur until late Tuesday afternoon, after the news had been reported. The company also banned the nurse from working under any of its contracts in the future. Wexford provides health-care services nationwide to roughly 124,000 inmates and other residents at more than 100 institutions.

The state said inmates exposed were notified and are being screened for infectious diseases. An independent laboratory under contract with Wexford will provide continuing medical monitoring and testing of the potentially exposed inmates over the next several months, the state said. All patients will be informed of their results, though Ryan noted that some inmates may previously have been exposed to hepatitis C.

Before the problem at the Buckeye prison, Wexford had issues in other states. Clark County, Wash., declined to renew a contract with Wexford in 2009 at its county jail and juvenile-detention center after complaints that Wexford was not dispensing medications to inmates in a timely fashion.

Tuesday, August 21, 2012

Art of Resistance: Justice Day Action at the Phoenix Art Museum!

On August 10, 2012 a small handful of us in Arizona celebrated Prisoners' Justice Day, which is a day to remember those who have died in state custody.  Some of us in the "free world" descended upon the Phoenix Art Museum for a sunrise action, seizing the public space in front of their sign on Central and Coronado for our canvas. There, about 25 members of the community chalked a 100-foot wide community memorial to nearly 70 victims of prison violence, neglect or despair, recommitting in the process to our fight for the living as well.

Security at the Art Museum seemed slow to respond for their part and they were mean when they did - we'd covered at least 80 feet by the time the chief came out to find out what was going on (he's lucky I can't find his card now and name him...). Turns out he called the Phoenix Police to see if they could send someone out to stop me, but Sgt Schweikert told him it wouldn't do any good. So, unable to have me arrested for soiling "their" clean sidewalk with my free speech, the custodians of our community's art and culture had a city crew hover on stand-by to wash away the names of the dead - including those put down by their mothers - the moment we left the sidewalk. 

Literally.

I found that to be downright disrespectful of everything from the first amendment to the grief of the families who were with us that day, not to mention petty and intolerant. If we were there about sick children and cancer instead of dying prisoners and AIDS or Hep C, would they have been less cruel? We decided that they wouldn't render us invisible again that easily, and Facebook was flooded with photos of the morning's action, mostly of the names of the dead.

In addition to the mothers of Carlo Krakoff, Joseph Venegas, and Dana Seawright, and loved ones of current prisoners, we were joined by former prisoners, anarchists from my neighborhood, Occupiers I was arrested with, artists from the Firehouse Gallery, immigrant rights activists, and Haley from the Phoenix Harm Reduction Organization (PHRO - check them out!). A cross section of the community I live and work in - small wonder that the Phoenix Art Museum thought it was too good for us.

Below is a little something I made from the photos of the action, many of which were taken by my comrade from 4th Ave jail, Janet Higgins, who made a special effort to document the individual names. Please print it up and send it inside, if you correspond with any prisoners. Let them know they have not been forgotten...


















Saturday, June 9, 2012

Marty Atencio's family fights back and files suit.

Thanks JJ and the AZ Republic for keeping up with this tragic case...and to Marty's family for holding the real bad guys accountable...

Marty Atencio





-----------from the Arizona Republic-------------


$20M claim alleges excessive force in AZ inmate's death

by JJ Hensley
Arizona Republic
June 8, 2012



The family of a man who died in December following an altercation with police and detention officers in a Maricopa County jail has filed a $20 million notice of claim against the city of Phoenix, the Sheriff's Office and the county agency responsible for health care in the jails.

The claim, filed Friday, alleges that excessive force, coupled with a series of failures by medical professionals to tend to Ernest "Marty" Atencio, contributed to the 44-year-old's death in December.

Atencio died four days after he was removed from a "safe cell" in the Fourth Avenue Jail.






document The notice of claim (WARNING: Contains graphic images)


The Maricopa County medical examiner last week issued a report that concluded that Atencio died of cardiac arrest, acute psychosis, medical problems and "law-enforcement subdual," but the report did not list a manner of death.

Atencio's family believes that the manner of death was homicide, committed at the hands of sheriff's detention officers in an altercation that began when two Phoenix police officers began to struggle with Atencio after he refused to remove his left shoe. They wanted the shoe removed to be scanned as he prepared to enter the jail.

The Phoenix officers took Atencio to the ground, and surveillance footage shows the detention officers dragging Atencio into a safe cell, where the number of officers in the small cell obscured their actions from the camera.
A safe cell is a room designed to reduce inmates' ability to injure themselves or others.

The claim contends that at least one officer punched Atencio and that another officer shocked Atencio with a stun gun six times, with several of those strikes coming within inches of his heart.

The notice of claim is a necessary precursor to a lawsuit against a public entity. State law requires a claim to list a dollar amount for which it can be settled. Atencio's family set that amount at $5 million for Phoenix police and $15 million for the county agencies.

The Sheriff's Office is continuing to investigate the incident and declined comment.

A pair of Phoenix police officers contacted Atencio twice on the night he was detained.

During the first contact, outside a convenience store, officers noticed that Atencio was acting erratically and told him to go home. Moments later, the officers received a call about a man kicking at a woman's apartment door in the 2800 block of West Laurel Lane. The officers recognized Atencio as the man they had encountered outside the convenience store, and they arrested him after the woman requested prosecution.

When Atencio arrived at the Fourth Avenue Jail's intake area -- where inmates are screened for medical and mental-health concerns and the most serious are supposed to receive immediate attention -- officers recognized his signs of mental illness but failed to respond, according to the claim.

"She (mental-health professional Monica Scarpati) admitted that she did not complete a full assessment of Marty and sent him to an isolation cell," the claim states. "Ms. Scarpati and (Correctional Health Services nurse Bill McClean) fell below the applicable standard of care by, in RN McClean's words, 'accepting' Marty into the jail and not doing anything to make sure that Marty got the immediate medical attention that he so obviously needed and deserved."

According to the claim, as Atencio waited for further processing, other officers noticed his mental state and began mocking him. According to an interview with an inmate who was nearby at the time, one officer thought Atencio's mug shot could be featured on the Sheriff's Office website that posts booking photos.

"An MCSO lieutenant stated in an interview that the process of taking Marty's photo was, 'Ah, you know, it's kinda comical,'" according to the claim.

As Atencio prepared to leave the booking area, he became uncooperative with Phoenix officers but was not violent or combative, according to interviews with officers contained in the claim.

Surveillance video shows that when a Phoenix officer placed his arm around Atencio's neck and took him to the ground, nearby officers joined in the effort to subdue Atencio. His family called the events that followed a "jailers' riot."

The claim does not request any damages from the Medical Examiner's Office, but it does allege that the office attempted to shield the county from liability by failing to name a manner of death from one of the four descriptions: suicide, homicide, natural causes or accidental.

"The medical examiner's report is part science and part defensive doublespeak designed to deflect and limit the county's liability," the claim states. "The notion that Marty's manner of death is 'undetermined' is a farcical sleight of hand by the county. The cardiac arrest was induced by the 'law-enforcement subdual,' so it was obviously a 'homicide,' i.e., caused at the hands of other human beings."

Tuesday, April 3, 2012

Solitary hell in Arizona: cruel, inhumane, and illegal.

 

Thanks to our friends at Amnesty International for flying out last summer - Chuck Ryan wouldn't let them in to see the prisoners, but he couldn't keep them away from the rest of us... 
and thanks again to Bob Ortega, who refuses to let up shining the light in the darkness of our state prisons.
------------------

Amnesty International accuses Arizona of abuse in prisons


Arizona's state prisons overuse solitary confinement in cruel, inhumane and illegal ways, particularly for mentally ill prisoners and juveniles as young as 14, the human-rights group Amnesty International charges in a report to be released today.

According to the report, which is to be delivered to the governor and state lawmakers, Arizona prisons use solitary confinement as a punishment more than most other states or the federal government.

document Report | document ACLU lawsuit | Suit: Inmates denied adequate care

The group found that some inmates are held in isolation for months and sometimes years, and it called on the state to use the practice only as a last resort and only for a short duration.

In addition, it asked that the practice not be used against children or people who are mentally ill or have behavioral disabilities. The group also called on state officials to improve conditions for prisoners in solitary confinement and to act to reduce the high number of suicides in Arizona's prisons.

Arizona Department of Corrections officials said they had not read the report Monday and were unable to comment.

According to the DOC, 3,130 inmates, or 8 percent of the state prison population, were being held in the highest-security, maximum-custody units as of Friday, and most were confined alone.

Although maximum-security inmates include those who are violent and may represent a threat to other inmates or staff, Amnesty noted that Arizona's own figures show that 35 percent of inmates in maximum security were committed for non-violent crimes.

Amnesty International's report cited sources who said prisoners are regularly assigned to maximum security for relatively minor rule violations or disruptive behavior, often because they have mental-health or behavioral problems.

The report noted cases of Arizona inmates who have been in solitary confinement continuously for 15 years. Amnesty said that various international human-rights treaties and experts, including the United Nations' Special Rapporteur on Torture, have called on states to limit the use of solitary confinement to exceptional circumstances, for short periods and to prohibit solitary confinement of children 17 and younger.

Amnesty's report found that 14 children 14 to 17 years old had been held in maximum custody at the Rincon unit in the Tucson state prison, under conditions similar to those of adults: 22 to 24 hours a day in their cells, limited exercise alone in a small cage and with no recreational activities.

Because children and adolescents are not fully developed physically and emotionally, they are less equipped to tolerate the effects of isolation, according to studies cited in the report.

Some charges in the Amnesty report echo those raised in a federal lawsuit filed by the Americal Civil Liberties Union and the Prison Law Office last month, alleging that Arizona's Department of Corrections doesn't provide adequate mental-health and medical care.

The state has not responded to that suit, and the Corrections spokesman said the department wouldn't respond to any parts of the Amnesty report that related to that litigation.

Last July, Corrections officials declined to meet with Amnesty representatives from London who were visiting Arizona, nor allow them to visit the Eyman state prison, which houses about 1,950 maximum-security inmates.

A spokesman said Corrections Director Charles Ryan had other commitments. In a letter to Amnesty, Ryan cited security concerns in declining their visit request. On that same tour, Texas and California correctional officials met with Amnesty's representatives, and California permitted them to visit maximum-custody units.
About 1 percent of federal inmates are held in conditions similar to Arizona's, according to data from the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

The U.S. holds more prisoners in solitary confinement than any other country in the world, Amnesty said.
With more than 8 percent of Arizona's inmate population in maximum security and a large portion of those inmates in solitary, the state's rate puts it at the high end among U.S. states, most of which hold from 1 to 3 percent of their inmates in some form of solitary confinement.

Most Arizona maximum-security inmates are isolated in "special management units," windowless cells that, contrary to the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners, have no direct access to sunlight or fresh air, and have lighting that is dimmed at night but left on 24 hours a day, the Amnesty report said.

Inmates in SMU units are not allowed to work. They typically receive two daily meals in their cells, have no contact with other inmates and are allowed out of their cell no more than three times a week for two hours for exercise and showers, in many cases in a windowless room with nothing except tall walls and a mesh over the roof.

Amnesty cited allegations that the cells are no longer steam-cleaned between inmates, so that food, urine and feces are stuck on the walls and food slots.

Both Amnesty International and inmates contacted by The Arizona Republic expressed concern that the conditions in solitary may contribute to Arizona's high prison suicide rate, which was double the national average last fiscal year. Seven of the 10 most recent suicides in state prisons were by inmates being held in solitary in maximum-security cells, according to Corrections death reports.

While many states, including California, New York, Massachusetts, Vermont, Ohio, Mississippi and Wisconsin, bar placing seriously mentally ill inmates in solitary because the social isolation and sensory deprivation can lead to further psychological deterioration, Arizona does not.

Amnesty cited reports that serious mental illnesses often go undiagnosed in Arizona prisons because of a lack of mental-health staff and inadequate screening and monitoring.

Amnesty reported that mental-health staff don't have weekly rounds, visiting maximum-security inmates only when there's a crisis, and consulting with them at their cell door.

It noted the ACLU lawsuit, which alleges that prisoners in solitary wait an average of six to eight months to see a psychologist, with some waiting more than a year. One prisoner diagnosed with serious mental illness spent two years in solitary without seeing a psychiatrist despite repeated requests and referrals by staff, according to the suit.

Amnesty noted 43 suicides listed by Corrections from October 2005 to April 2011 and said that of the 37 cases in which it was able to collect information, 22 -- or 60 percent -- took place in maximum-custody solitary units. There have been at least eight more suicides since April 2011 and 16 other deaths that the department described only as "under investigation."

In letters to The Republic, inmates have raised concerns similar to those in the Amnesty report. "While on suicide watch here at SMU-1, the lights stay on all night and make it impossible to sleep -- all day, all night," wrote Dustin Brislan, an inmate with a serious mental illness in solitary confinement at Eyman.

"Lack of contact, of seeing the outside, seeing any bit of sunlight, smelling fresh air, all of that has increased my mental illness. I'm only allowed recreation every other day, where I'm put in a windowless cell off area."

The Eyman prison is the only one in Arizona not accredited by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care, which requires that prisoners being held in solitary confinement have at least weekly contact with mental-health staff.

By contrast, North Dakota's prison system hasn't had a suicide in 12 years, and none in maximum security since the early 1990s, according to that state's director of corrections and rehabilitation, Leann Bertsch.

"People with mental illness do very poorly in isolation," she said, "so we work with them intensively because we don't want them staying in isolation for long."

That means constant supervision, daily visits with behavioral counselors, and other interventions by trained staff as part of a comprehensive suicide-prevention policy.

The Amnesty report also questioned why Arizona's Corrections Department requires all prisoners sentenced to life to spend at least their first two years in solitary confinement, regardless of whether they pose a threat to other inmates or guards.

"There appears to be no valid reason," the report said. American Bar Association standards call for prisoners to be kept in solitary more than a year only if the prisoner poses a "continuing, serious threat."

Many states have reduced solitary confinement in recent years, often under court order, only to find that their costs drop and prisoners behave better when they aren't in solitary.

Mississippi cut the use of solitary by 80 percent in 2007, and Maine by 60 percent last year.

Amnesty International said Arizona should:

• Reduce the number of prisoners in isolation to only those who are a serious and continuing threat.

• Improve overall conditions, provide more out-of-cell time, better exercise facilities, meaningful education and rehabilitation programs.

• Introduce measures to allow some group interactions and association to benefit inmates' mental health and provide incentives for better behavior.

• Remove all serious mentally ill prisoners from solitary and prohibit them from being placed in solitary.

• Improve mental-health monitoring; take steps to reduce suicide, including more humane conditions in suicide watch cells; and prohibit solitary confinement of prisoners under 18.

Tuesday, March 13, 2012

Katrina revisited: judgment against sheriff reversed.

This is both an astonishing story and significant case, so I'm reprinting it all here. These guys were falsely imprisoned in Orleans Parish following Hurricane Katrina, and it looks like the whole bunch of folks responsible for it are getting off scott free. For how they treated all their prisoners, the sheriff and his people should really be strung up. This goes to show how incredibly hard it is to hold state actors accountable for gross negligence and abuse - hell, even when they commit atrocities, like what prison guards did to Marcia Powell in Arizona, it's hard to get anyone fired, much less prosecuted or sued...

--------------

WAGANFEALD v. GUSMAN

ROBIE J. WAGANFEALD; PAUL W. KUNKEL, JR., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MARLIN N. GUSMAN, Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff; WILLIAM C. HUNTER, OPCSO Chief Deputy, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 11-30081.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed March 12, 2012.

Before: KING, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.



WIENER, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs-Appellees Robie J. Waganfeald and Paul W. Kunkel, Jr. (collectively, "Appellees") filed this action against several defendants, including Defendants-Appellants Marlin N. Gusman, Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff, and William C. Hunter, Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff's Office Chief Deputy (collectively, "Appellants"), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights. The Appellees also brought a false imprisonment claim against the Appellants under Louisiana law. Appellees' claims arise out of their incarceration in New Orleans at and around the time that Hurricane Katrina struck the city. After trial, a jury found that Appellants were not liable for some of those claims, but (1) held Gusman liable for falsely imprisoning Appellees, and (2) held Hunter liable for denying Appellees' purported Sixth Amendment right to use a telephone following their arrest. We reverse the jury's verdict as to both claims for which Appellants were held liable.
I. Facts & Proceedings
A. Facts
The facts of this case are largely undisputed. On the evening of Friday, August 26, 2005, Appellees, traveling by car from Houston, Texas to Toledo, Ohio, stopped for the night in New Orleans. They checked into a hotel, then proceeded to the French Quarter, some time after 1:00 a.m. on the morning of August 27, and remained there for approximately four hours, consuming several beers each. At approximately 5:00 a.m., two New Orleans police officers placed Appellees under arrest for public intoxication under New Orleans Municipal Code § 54-405. Appellees assert that they were not intoxicated when the arrests took place, but instead that Kunkel fell to the ground when his bad knee gave out as he stepped off a curb, and that Waganfeald was attempting to help Kunkel to his feet.
At the time of the arrests, Hurricane Katrina was in the Gulf of Mexico and was estimated to make landfall on Monday morning. For several days prior to Katrina's estimated landfall, Gusman and his staff prepared the Orleans Parish Prison ("OPP") to weather the storm with all staff and all prisoners-an average daily population of 5,800-remaining inside the complex. At that time, OPP comprised eleven main facilities which held inmates, as well as ancillary buildings. In the event of serious flooding, Gusman's plan called for staff and prisoners to "vertically evacuate" to the upper floors of the OPP facilities. On the morning of Sunday, August 28, a mandatory evacuation order was issued for residents of New Orleans, but that order did not apply to OPP staff and prisoners.
Appellees' arresting officers took them to the Intake and Processing Center ("IPC") at OPP, at which point Appellees' money, valuables, and cell phones were confiscated. Appellees were not given an opportunity to make bail, but instead were placed in the Templeman III facility at OPP, which could house as many as 1,200 pre-trial detainees. At the time, Gusman was in charge of OPP, Hunter directed prison operations, and Warden Gary Bordelon oversaw Templeman III.
Normally, a number of telephones-both free and collect-were available for inmate use in the IPC. Collect telephones were also available in the Templeman III building. For security reasons, cell phones were not allowed in the prison complex. After being booked, Appellees attempted to make phone calls using the IPC telephones, but soon discovered that they were not working. That Saturday, Hunter, who was responsible for the phone system, became aware that all of the telephones at OPP were inoperable. Hunter instructed the telephone supervisor, Donald Hancock, to report to the prison. Hancock examined the system that day and determined that the telephone service provider's lines were overloaded. Because the problem was not with the OPP telephones themselves, prison officials were unable to remedy the problem. Hancock reported his findings to Hunter at some point that weekend. Sheriff Gusman testified that he was not made aware of the problem with the phones. Gusman further testified that, in theory, he or Hunter could have allowed the inmates to use their cell phones, but Gusman emphasized that prison policy forbids cell phone use (even by most deputies) because of security risks. OPP phones remained inoperable throughout the weekend, and Appellees were unable to make any phone calls during that time.
After being booked, Appellees were placed in separate cells in Templeman III, where they remained as Hurricane Katrina approached and then hit New Orleans at approximately 6:00 AM on Monday, August 29, 2005. Initially, OPP officials believed that the complex had weathered the storm unscathed. After the levees were breached and the city flooded, however, the prison's generators stopped working, and its water and food supplies were contaminated. As floodwater entered the Templeman III building, officers evacuated inmates to higher floors. Appellees experienced insufferable conditions as the water rose in their cells. Kunkel was locked in his cell until Wednesday evening; Waganfeald was moved to a miniature gymnasium within OPP. Both Kunkel and Waganfeald went without food and water for approximately three days. The temperature was very high; there was no air circulation; the toilets did not flush. In the midst of this chaos, Appellees believed that the prison guards had abandoned them, and they had no way of making contact with the outside world. Both men believed that they might die.
Appellees were finally moved from OPP on Wednesday, August 31, but this did not mark the end of their ordeals. They were taken by boat to a highway overpass, where they, along with thousands of other inmates, continued to endure heat, hunger, and thirst. Appellees were then placed on buses and transported out of New Orleans. For about a month, Kunkel endured further deplorable conditions, first at Louisiana's Hunt Correctional Institute, and then at the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, before being released on October 3, 2005. Waganfeald was taken to Cathoula Parish Prison and was released on October 5, 2005. Other than an eye infection for which Kunkel received treatment at Angola, Appellees did not suffer physical injuries, but both men have reported psychological trauma as a result of these experiences.
B. Proceedings
Appellees filed suit on August 28, 2006, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment (based on their allegedly unlawful detention), the Sixth Amendment (based on their inability to contact counsel by telephone), and the Eighth Amendment (based on their conditions of confinement). Their complaint also asserted claims for false imprisonment under Louisiana law. The named defendants included Gusman, individually and in his official capacity as Criminal Sheriff of Orleans Parish; Hunter, individually and in his official capacity as Chief Deputy Criminal Sheriff of Orleans Parish; Bordelon, individually and in his official capacity as Warden of the Templeman III jail facility; various officers of the New Orleans Police Department; the City of New Orleans; and Mayor C. Ray Nagin.
Appellees proceeded to trial against Gusman, Hunter, and Bordelon. On October 14, 2010, the jury found Gusman liable for false imprisonment and awarded compensatory damages of $200,000 to Waganfeald and $259,300 to Kunkel. The jury found, however, that Gusman was not liable for the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment claims. The jury also rejected the claims against Gusman in this official capacity, finding that his official policies were not the moving force behind any violation of Appellees' constitutional rights. Additionally, the jury found Hunter liable for violating the Appellees' Sixth Amendment right to counsel, denied qualified immunity to Hunter, and awarded each Appellee $100,000 for these violations. The jury rejected the remaining claims against Hunter, and it exonerated Bordelon on all claims. The district court then entered judgment later that month.
At the close of Appellees' case and at the close of evidence, Appellants orally moved for judgment as a matter of law. The district court denied each motion. After the jury verdict was announced, Appellants moved for judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court denied both motions, and Appellants timely appealed.
II. Standard of Review
With regard to issues that were preserved in the district court, we review its denial of judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.1 Judgment as a matter of law is proper "[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue[.]"2 "[W]e will uphold a jury verdict unless the facts and inferences point so strongly and so overwhelmingly in favor of one party that reasonable men could not arrive at any verdict to the contrary."3 Further, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's determination, and we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute the jury's reasonable factual inferences for our own.4
III. False Imprisonment Claim Against Gusman
The jury rejected all claims against Gusman relating to Appellees' conditions of confinement and their inability to make telephone calls. The jury found Gusman liable for false imprisonment, however, which under Louisiana law consists of two elements: "(1) detention of the person; and (2) the unlawfulness of the detention."5 It is undisputed that Gusman detained the Appellees, and thus, the question at issue is whether that detention was unlawful.
The only basis urged by Appellees that their detention was unlawful is Gusman's failure to release them when they were not granted a probable cause determination within 48 hours after their arrest. Under Louisiana law, a person who is arrested and in custody is "entitled to a determination of probable cause within forty-eight hours of arrest."6 If such a determination is not timely made, "the arrested person shall be released on his own recognizance."7 This statute tracks the United States Supreme Court's decision in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,8 in which the Court held that a probable cause determination must generally be made within 48 hours to comply with the Fourth Amendment.9 As Appellees were arrested at approximately 5:00 a.m. on Saturday, August 27, 2005, this 48-hour period expired at 5:00 a.m. on Monday, August 29-just as Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast. Appellees had received no probable cause determination as of that Monday morning, but Gusman continued to detain them.
Appellees insist that the 48-hour rule permits no exceptions, but the United States and Louisiana Supreme Courts have indicated otherwise. In Riverside, the United States Supreme Court stated that if a probable cause determination is not made within 48 hours, "the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance."10 Likewise, interpreting the relevant state statute, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated in Louisiana v. Wallace:
In the absence of a bona fide emergency or other extreme circumstances, all persons arrested without a warrant for whom a probable cause determination is not made within 48 hours must be immediately released from custody on their own recognizance.11
This statement constitutes dicta, as Wallace did not involve an emergency, but it nonetheless demonstrates that the Louisiana Supreme Court recognizes an emergency exception to the 48-hour rule.12 Notably, the emergency exception in Wallace is worded almost identically to the same exception in Riverside, the decision that led to the creation of the Louisiana statute in the first place. It is therefore plain that both the federal and the Louisiana 48-hour rules contain an emergency exception. This aligns with common sense, because adopting Appellees' position that the 48-hour rule permits absolutely no exception could lead to any number of absurd consequences. Thus, in determining whether Appellees' detention was unlawful, we apply the emergency exception to the 48-hour requirement.
Gusman maintains that his detention of Appellees falls within this emergency exception. He also contends that he is immune from liability for false imprisonment under Louisiana's discretionary immunity statute.13 Appellees counter the latter point by claiming that Gusman waived his discretionary immunity defense in the trial court and cannot raise it on appeal. In particular, Appellees note that although Gusman raised discretionary immunity in his answer and in his post-verdict Rule 50(b) and Rule 59 motions, he failed to raise the issue in the pre-trial order or in his Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law.14 Appellees themselves may have waived this waiver argument by failing to raise it in opposition to Gusman's Rule 50(b) motion,15 but we do not reach that issue, or the discretionary immunity argument at all. Rather, we reverse the jury's verdict on the simpler and more direct ground that Gusman's actions fall within the emergency exception to the 48-hour rule.16
The undisputed evidence in this case compels the conclusion that Hurricane Katrina was a bona fide emergency within the meaning of the emergency exception to the 48-hour rule. Indeed, if Katrina was not an emergency, it is difficult to imagine any set of facts that would fit that description. As the storm bore down on New Orleans, Gusman and his officers had to provide for the security and safety of approximately 5,800 of their own inmates, plus 130 more inmates who were transferred from St. Bernard Parish.17 The officers planned to evacuate inmates vertically in the Templeman III building to higher floors, if necessary. They also stockpiled food and water in the Templeman III building-on the first floor, unfortunately.
OPP initially survived the storm without flooding, but this changed rapidly after the levees were breached. The water rising on the first floor of Templeman III quickly reached waist level, the generator went out, and food and water supplies were contaminated. The electronic system for controlling the cell doors ceased to function, and officers had to open the doors manually, which-for some cells on the first floor-required the officers to dive into the water to manipulate the locking mechanism. The temperature grew very hot, and the officers allowed the inmates to break windows for purposes of air ventilation. The officers worked for many hours with inadequate food, water, and sleep. After the arduous process of evacuating the inmates was completed, the officers continued working to evacuate other individuals who were stranded in the neighborhood. In light of this clear emergency, we hold that the 48-hour rule was suspended. Consequently, Gusman did not falsely imprison the Appellees by holding them without a probable cause determination rather than releasing them into the teeth of the storm on the morning of August 29, 2005.
Appellees contend that they would not have received a probable cause determination within 48 hours of their arrest even in the absence of Hurricane Katrina, because the Municipal Courts did not operate on the weekends at that time. The jury, however, answered "No" to the following interrogatory:
Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Sheriff Marlin Gusman, in his capacity as the Criminal Sheriff of Orleans Parish, had a policy, practice, or custom of deliberate indifference to arrested individuals' right to have a probable cause determination made by an impartial judge or magistrate within 48 hours of an arrest made without a warrant that was the moving force behind a violation of [Appellees'] constitutional rights?
If Gusman had a general policy of detaining individuals beyond 48 hours without a probable cause hearing, even in the absence of an emergency, that interrogatory would have to have been answered in the affirmative. In that situation, the municipal policy would certainly have been "adopted with `deliberate indifference' to its known or obvious consequences."18 Further, the municipal policy would be the "`moving force' behind the constitutional violation,"19 as there would unquestionably have been a "direct causal link"20 between Gusman's policy and the violation of the 48-hour rule. But, as the jury answered "No," and Appellees have not appealed that factual finding, they cannot rely on Gusman's purported policy of violating the 48-hour rule even in non-emergency conditions.
Gusman's detention of Appellees was not unlawful because his actions fell within the emergency exception to the 48-hour rule. Thus, we must reverse the district court's denial of Gusman's motion for judgment as a matter of law. We thus do not reach Gusman's additional argument that the jury's verdict was internally inconsistent.
IV. Sixth Amendment Claim Against Hunter
The jury found that Chief Deputy Hunter acted in a manner that was deliberately indifferent to Appellees' asserted Sixth Amendment right to use a telephone to contact "an attorney and/or family and friends" following their arrest. The jury also rejected Hunter's defense of qualified immunity. On appeal, Hunter contends that the district court erred by denying him qualified immunity because (1) there was no violation of Appellees' Sixth Amendment right to counsel because that right never attached, no "critical stage" of the proceedings was reached, and Hunter did not act intentionally; and (2) even if there were such a violation, it had not been clearly established that refusing to allow pre-trial detainees to use cell phones when land lines are disrupted in an emergency violates the Sixth Amendment.
"A public official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the defendant violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and (2) the defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the violation."21 A defendant violates clearly established law only if "the contours of [the] right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right."22 For a legal principle to be clearly established, "we must be able to point to controlling authority—or a robust consensus of persuasive authority—that defines the contours of the right in question with a high degree of particularity"23 and that places the statutory or constitutional question "beyond debate."24
When a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that it is inapplicable.25 Qualified immunity should be adjudicated "at the earliest possible stage in litigation,"26 but "if the issue is not decided until trial the defense goes to the jury which must then determine the objective legal reasonableness of the officers' conduct."27 We have discretion to decide which prong of the qualified immunity analysis to address first.28
As a preliminary matter, Appellees contend that Hunter has waived qualified immunity. Hunter raised qualified immunity generally in his answer and proposed jury instructions, the district court instructed the jury on qualified immunity, and the jury found that Hunter's actions were not objectively reasonable in light of Appellees' constitutional rights. Hunter did not raise qualified immunity in his pre-verdict motions for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a),29 but he did in his post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b). In response to Hunter's Rule 50(b) motion, Appellees did not counter that Hunter waived qualified immunity but instead responded to the merits of that issue. Thus, Appellees have waived their waiver argument.30
Appellees also contend that even if Hunter has not waived qualified immunity generally, he has waived his specific contentions that Appellees' Sixth Amendment right to counsel never attached and that no "critical stage" of the proceedings was reached. In lieu of addressing this specific waiver argument, we hold that even if Appellees had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the period in question, Hunter did not act in an objectively unreasonable manner in light of clearly established law, so the district court should have granted him judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity.
There is no dispute that, during the period in question, telephones were made available to Appellees, but that it was not possible to place calls on these or any telephones at the facility. Donald Hancock, the telephone supervisor for the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff's Office, testified that on the Saturday before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, calls could not be placed from OPP because the telephone service provider's lines were overloaded. He testified further that because the problem was external, and the OPP telephones themselves were functioning properly, there was nothing he could have done to remedy the problem. Hancock timely reported his findings to Hunter and evacuated New Orleans that Sunday morning. When Hancock and Hunter spoke again later that day, Hunter asked Hancock to return and continue working on the phones, but Hancock again informed Hunter that the problem was external and that there was nothing he could do.
Appellees contend that in this situation, Hunter should have allowed them to use their cell phones to make calls. In accordance with standard procedures, Appellees' cell phones had been confiscated when they were booked into the prison. As noted, Gusman testified that inmates are not allowed to possess cell phones because that would pose a "security risk." He went on to explain that allowing the use of cell phones would impair prison officials' ability to record inmates' calls, which is important because "inmates either make threatening phone calls or try to continue their illegal activity while in jail." Gusman also stated that, for security reasons, even deputies are generally not allowed to carry cell phones while on duty. Gusman testified that he was completely unaware of the problems with the OPP telephone system during the period in question, but he acknowledged that Hunter would have had the authority to allow prisoners to use their cell phones.
There is no particularized, clearly established law which would have instructed Hunter that, under the Sixth Amendment, he had to allow pre-trial detainees to use their cell phones when land lines were disrupted. Appellees have pointed us to no such authority, and we have found none. To the contrary, we have ruled that prisoners have "no right to unlimited telephone use."31 Other courts have observed that "a prisoner's right to telephone access is subject to rational limitations in the face of legitimate security interests of the penal institution.'"32 As a general matter, "maintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees."33 Thus, prison officials are "accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security."34
In this case, Hunter faced the security risks that would generally follow from allowing prisoners to use cell phones, which were exacerbated by the emergency conditions that were present during the approach, landfall, and aftermath of Katrina. Inmates were unable to use the land-line telephones in the OPP not because of any action that Hunter took, but because of overloaded external lines, a situation beyond any control of law enforcement. Distributing cell phones to approximately 5,930 inmates, or even just the 1,200 pre-trial detainees in Templeman III, would have been a creative and potentially beneficial option, but it would also have added to prison officials' unprecedented logistical burden as well as the potential security risks. Before Hurricane Katrina struck, prison officials had no reason to assume that the telephone lines would be overloaded for a significant length of time; after the prison flooded, they were overwhelmed with more urgent emergency tasks. The unprecedented emergency conditions would also have made it very difficult if not impossible for any counsel that Appellees might have reached to provide meaningful assistance. We do not suggest (or deny) that there is a blanket emergency exception to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Rather, we hold only that in light of the security risks and unique emergency conditions he faced, Hunter did not act in an objectively unreasonable manner under clearly established law. The district court therefore erred by not granting Hunter qualified immunity as a matter of law.
V. Conclusion
There is no doubt that Appellees suffered terribly while held in custody after Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans. It is equally clear, however, that (1) Gusman's failure to release Appellees falls within the emergency exception to the rule that a probable cause determination must be made within 48 hours, and (2) Hunter's failure to allow Appellees to use cell phones was not objectively unreasonable in light of any clearly established law. We therefore reverse and vacate the judgment of the district court, and remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Gusman and Hunter on all claims asserted by Appellees.
REVERSED, VACATED, and REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Footnotes


1. Julian v. City of Houston, 314 F.3d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 2002).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).
3. Cousin v. Trans Union Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2001).
4. Id.
5. Kennedy v. Sheriff of East Baton Rouge, 935 So.2d 669, 690 (La. 2006).
6. La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 230.2(A).
7. Id. art. 230.2(B)(1) (emphasis added).
8. 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
9. See Louisiana v. Wallace, 25 So.3d 720, 723-24 (La. 2009) (Louisiana statute codified Riverside).
10. Id. at 57.
11. 25 So.3d at 727.
12. See Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 328 (5th Cir. 1999) ("A federal court has a duty to determine state law as it believes the State's highest court would.").
13. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2798.1 ("Liability shall not be imposed on public entities or their officers or employees based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform their policymaking or discretionary acts when such acts are within the course and scope of their lawful powers and duties.").
14. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co., 639 F.3d 701, 707-08 (5th Cir. 2011) (when a party fails to raise an issue in a Rule 50(a) motion, it waives the right to raise that issue in a Rule 50(b) motion).
15. See Thompson and Wallace of Memphis, Inc. v. Falconwood Corp., 100 F.3d 429, 435 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that when the party opposing the Rule 50(b) motion "did not raise the waiver bar in opposing the [R]ule 50(b) motion, they may not raise that bar on appeal"); see also Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 980 F.2d 648, 661 n.20 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that even if the defendant waived a particular defense by failing to include it in the pre-trial order, the plaintiffs waived that waiver by failing to make the waiver argument in front of the district court); but see Scribner v. Dillard, 141 F. App'x 240, 243 (5th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (holding that "waiver of waiver" per Thompson does not apply when defendants failed to raise defense, not only in Rule 50(a) motion, but at any time prior to the verdict; the defense was therefore considered waived).
16. The emergency exception presents no waiver issue: Gusman raised the exception in the pre-trial order, the district court instructed the jury on it, and Gusman presses the issue on appeal.
17. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:706(c) ("The sheriff of the parish to which the prisoner is conveyed shall keep the prisoner safe and secure").
18. Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1998).
19. Id.
20. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 580 (5th Cir. 2001).
21. Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011).
22. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).
23. Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371-72 (5th Cir. 2011).
24. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2083.
25. Atteberry v. Nocona General Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 2005).
26. Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).
27. McCoy v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2000).
28. Morgan, 659 F.3d at 371 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a).
30. See Thompson and Wallace of Memphis, Inc. v. Falconwood Corp., 100 F.3d 429, 435 (5th Cir. 1996) (waiver of waiver).
31. Lopez v. Reyes, 692 F.2d 15, 17 (5th Cir. 1982).
32. Douglas v. Gusman, 567 F.Supp.2d 877, 886 (E.D.La. 2008) (quoting Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1100 (6th Cir.1994)); see also Benzel v. Grammar, 869 F.2d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 1989) (same).
33. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979).
34. Id. at 547; see also id. (security considerations "are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.") (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322 (1986) ("prophylactic" prison security measures are entitled to deference, even if there exist "arguably superior alternatives").